potrero view

July 2009

Going to War

By David Matsuda

During my first tour of duty to Iraq I was deployed with brigade combat teams which patrolled an area that included Sadr City – named for Ayatollah Sadiq Sadiq al Sadr, the father of Moqtada al Sadr – and Adamiyah, where anti al Qae’da tribal awakening councils emerged as some of the first paid Sons of Iraq.  I conducted neighborhood negotiations, and helped Coalition Forces (CF) understand and assist local governments, as frequently embodied in sheiks and tribes.

This time around I serve at Corps level.  I report to the General of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), who is the United States military’s second in command in Iraq.   He meets with officials of security-related ministries, like the Minister of Defense, who is in charge of the Iraqi Army, and the Minister of Interior, whose portfolio includes the police, national police, and border enforcement.  At Corps I must think beyond neighborhoods to national level policy, and beyond local sheiks to the heads of large tribal confederations.  

Iraq is a tribal nation.  Whether dressed in western business attire, jeans and t-shirts, traditional aghal – male head wrap with rope head-band – and dish-dasha – male robe – or in the wide variety of head scarves worn by females, Iraq’s 27 million people have kin-based tribal relationships and alliances that form the basis for all political, economic, legal and military institutions and activity.

Because I’ve been involved in more than one hundred meetings with sheikhs, majles al shuyukh – sheiks councils – and all manner of tribal power brokers, I was asked to be an advisor to the MNC-I Tribal Engagement Team (TET).  As the Commanding General’s Cultural Advisor, it’s my job to work with TET to help military units throughout the country identify and negotiate with the sheiks and tribes in their areas of operation.     

Early in the war CF ignored tribes, to their detriment.  Tribes, some numbering in the millions, crosscut ethno-sectarian boundaries, creating unmarked borders and kin-based voting blocs.  To successfully engage tribal peoples I’ve had to learn urf, or tribal customary law. With guidance from helpful sheiks, I came to understand that tribal support isn’t gained through winning hearts and minds, but by respecting how the lives of tribal peoples and cultures are structured around honor and shame. In Iraq’s tribal society acting honorably means meeting ones obligations in times of war and peace and, most importantly, erasing shame and restoring honor through revenge, banishment or feud.

For instance, if a man shirks – willingly disregards his duty – he dishonors his family.  If the offense is within the khams – five male kin related to the same patriarchal lineage head – the male offender is punished or banished by the family. If his offense is between families, he may be killed by the offended party to start or settle a blood feud.  If a female has had sex out of wedlock or is suspected of improper behavior, she may be subjected to an honor killing.  

From a collective point of view the tribe’s status relative to other tribes is lowered by individual offenses.  The reduction of a tribe’s honor means that its sheiks and sheikas are locked out of arranged marriages with former same status peers who may bring access to political influence, lucrative business contacts, paramilitary alliances and deterrence.  To raise its status back to pre-shame level the tribe is obligated to right individual wrongs and re-raise its collective status through honor – restoration – killing, banishment, and/or feud.

I recently met with the sheik al masha’ik, or paramount sheik, of a tribe numbering close to two million.  Using what I’d learned from previous encounters, I introduced myself and asked to see Iraq through his eyes.  I said that it was an honor to meet him, and that his reputation for having a strong and just right hand preceded him.  I then quoted from the Qur’an and said that, and here I paraphrase, ‘…it is wise to seek one who is both consulted and who consults.’  We chatted for more than two hours, during which time the sheik confided that he’d been reluctant to engage with CF and that he needed help negotiating a large dispute between two ethno-sectarian groups.  With my background in organizational development, I helped him identify the need for stakeholder analysis, a neutral facilitator, conflict resolution and confidence-building measures as the way forward.  I handed my findings to the local CF commander, who promised to help the sheik.

           

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