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David Matsuda in Iraq

October 2009

Going to War

By David Matsuda

When Lieutenant General Charles Jacoby, commanding general for Multi-National Corps-Iraq, asked me to come to Iraq, he wanted me to tell him what I thought would be the greatest challenge.  “Sir, in every deployment you have to know your enemy.  This time it’s going to be more important to know your ally,” I replied.

I joined the Human Terrain Team program, which embedded anthropologists with combat brigades in Iraq to help tactical field commanders understand local cultures.  In 2006 and 2007, I was deployed to Sadr City and the Sunni Triangle region, assisting in more than 100 engagements.  Early in the war American advisors would suggest to their Iraqi counterparts that they improve their capabilities.  What they didn’t realize was that Iraqis took that advice as a promise from U.S. forces to improve their capabilities for them.   When that didn’t happen, the Iraqis felt that U.S. forces had made false promises.  “What is better to do, is say ‘Sir, if you could do three things to do to solve your problem what would they be,’” I suggested.  “And at the end you say, ‘Great, how can I support you?’”

During my first deployment I perceived a general mistrust among Iraqi Security Forces.  But because of consistent leadership from Jacoby and his predecessors, there’s been a profound change toward mutual trust and cooperation.  “The Iraqis are willing to listen to what we say, maybe more importantly we are going to listen to what they have to say, not always trying to bend them to the way we think an army should run,” Jacoby said. “There is a tremendous amount of trust at the command level.”

Cultural differences have led to a difference in how the Iraqi Army is structured compared to the U.S. military.  In the U.S. military officers are empowered to make decisions on the battlefield.  However, the Iraqi Army is driven by officers at the top.  This caused problems when company commanders tried to plan operations with their counterparts following the Security Agreement.   Sometimes the result was a severe reprimand for the Iraqi commander and a Security Agreement violation for the U.S. commander.

It’s imperative to recognize that Iraq is a rank-conscious society driven by honor and shame.  In one meeting I attended between an Iraqi general and American colonel, the general’s aide was full of good ideas. When the colonel told the general he should listen to his aide, he offended the general. While the general acknowledged that the ideas were good, he refused to implement them.  We now realize you may not have to speak the language, but if you can behave customarily toward Iraqis, in ways that give them honor and respect, you can go a long way.

Potrero Hill resident Dave Matsuda is deployed in Iraq, and sends back monthly dispatches about his experiences.


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